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TRACK ME MAYBE:  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE USE OF CELL PHONE TRACKING TO 
FACILITATE ARREST  
Jeremy H. Rothstein* 
 
Police use of technology to locate and track criminal suspects has drawn 
increasing attention from courts, commentators, and the public.  In United 
States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that police installation of a GPS 
tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Less attention has been paid to police tracking of cell 
phones—a far more common practice.  Police can now locate a cell phone 
within several feet, using either GPS or information taken from cell towers. 
In August 2011, the government asked a federal magistrate judge in 
Maryland to allow thirty days of cell phone GPS tracking to aid in the 
apprehension of the subject of an arrest warrant.  The judge denied the 
application, ruling that precise tracking for any period would be a search, 
and that an arrest warrant did not make the search reasonable under 
Payton v. New York, which allows officers to arrest the subject of an arrest 
warrant in his home if the officers reasonably believe he is present. 
This Note examines the magistrate judge’s opinion, considers critical 
commentary, and analyzes a 2006 district court case holding that imprecise 
tracking to aid apprehension was constitutional.  Cell phone tracking raises 
different issues than the vehicular GPS considered in Jones.  Cell phone 
tracking does not involve a physical trespass, but it does follow individuals 
into private spaces.  The Note concludes that precise cell phone tracking is 
a search and argues that such a search could be reasonable under Payton, 
but only if carefully limited.  While cell phone tracking to aid arrest 
increases public safety by helping police arrest criminal suspects quickly 
and efficiently, it should not be used to find evidence of crime.  Judges 
should only allow tracking for one or two days to ensure that police quickly 
apprehend subjects of arrest warrants, rather than exploit cell phones to 
conduct unauthorized investigations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Police track thousands of cell phones every year.1  Generally, neither the 
target nor the public ever learns of a tracking order.2  Requests to track cell 
phones are sealed, and the judges who consider them seldom publish 
opinions.3  One federal magistrate judge has estimated that federal courts 
alone approve 20,000–30,000 tracking requests annually, and the number is 
rising.4  This Note examines the constitutionality of tracking a cell phone 
belonging to the subject of an arrest warrant to facilitate his arrest. 
There is no consensus as to whether cell phone tracking constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.5  In only the past few years, 
technological advances have enabled cell phone tracking to provide an 
accurate location to within several feet.6  The pace of change has rendered 
obsolete court decisions from even four years ago:  cases that considered 
technology that could only place users within hundreds of feet.7  While the 
 
 1. Julia Angwin & Scott Thurm, Judges Weigh Phone Tracking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 
2011, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (“Little is known about the practice because tracking requests are typically sealed 
from public view.”). 
 4. Id. (“Magistrate Stephen Smith of Houston, Texas, who approves such surveillance 
orders, has been studying the available data and estimates that federal courts alone issue 
20,000 to 30,000 cellphone tracking orders annually.”). 
 5. Id. (“The widening practice also presents one of the biggest privacy questions in a 
generation . . . .”). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.4.c. 
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issue is by no means closed, no published opinions have approved the use 
of precise cell phone tracking in a criminal investigation without a search 
warrant,8 and the only district court judge to rule on the issue found it 
unconstitutional.9  But criminal investigations are not the only law 
enforcement use for cell phone tracking. 
In August 2011, police asked Magistrate Judge Susan K. Gauvey of the 
District of Maryland to authorize precise, persistent cell phone tracking to 
locate the subject of an arrest warrant.10  The government argued that cell 
phone tracking is not a search and that, even if tracking is a search, Payton 
v. New York,11 which allows officers to enter a private home for the limited 
purpose of executing an arrest warrant, permits the “lesser intrusion” of cell 
phone tracking.12  Judge Gauvey disagreed and issued an extensive opinion, 
In re United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location 
Information of a Specified Wireless Telephone13 (Specified Wireless 
Telephone), finding that precise, persistent cell phone tracking to facilitate 
arrest was unconstitutional.14  The decision drew criticism from Professor 
Orin Kerr, who argued that such tracking is constitutional.  This Note 
examines both perspectives.15 
Determining the constitutionality of precisely tracking a cell phone to 
facilitate arrest involves two distinct questions:  First, is precise, persistent 
cell phone tracking a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?  
And second, if cell phone tracking does constitute a search, would that 
search be reasonable if used to aid in the apprehension of the subject of an 
arrest warrant?  To answer these questions, this Note also analyzes United 
States v. Bermudez,16 a 2006 district court case that held that Payton 
justified brief, imprecise tracking.17 
Part I outlines the technologies and constitutional doctrines at issue.  
Then, Part II explores the controversy over cell phone tracking with an 
arrest warrant.  Finally, Part III argues that while cell phone tracking 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, it can be a reasonable 
one.  Under court supervision, limited use of cell phone tracking to 
apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant is constitutional. 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B.4.c. 
 9. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-MC-223 (S.D. Tex, Nov. 11, 2011), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/hughesorder1116.pdf. 
 10. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter 
Specified Wireless Tel.]. 
 11. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 12. See infra notes 325–26 and accompanying text. 
 13. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See Part II.B.2. 
 16. No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2007).  On 
appeal the Seventh Circuit did not review the cell phone tracking issue. Amaral-Estrada, 509 
F.3d at 829. 
 17. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, at *11.  
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I.  ELECTRONIC LOCATION TRACKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.18  To determine the constitutionality of precise, persistent 
tracking to facilitate arrest, a court must first decide whether the practice is 
a search.  If it is, the court must then consider whether the arrest warrant 
makes that search reasonable.  Part I.A examines the technology police use 
to track cell phones.  Part I.B analyzes the doctrines courts apply to 
determine whether a police practice is a search and discusses the application 
of those doctrines to new technology.  Part I.C explains the requirements of 
arrest and search warrants, and considers the power of an arrest warrant 
under Payton. 
A.  Cell Phone Tracking and Its Use by Law Enforcement 
In a very short time, consumer location technology has become 
ubiquitous.  It has also become increasingly accurate.  This section details 
the evolution and future of the two technologies used to track phones:  the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and cell-site location information.  It then 
provides a brief overview of the use of this technology by police. 
1.  GPS 
GPS is a constellation of satellites operated by the U.S. Air Force.19  A 
device communicating with the GPS satellites can calculate its own velocity 
and location in three dimensions.20  All phones sold since 2003 are GPS-
enabled.21  GPS technology in cell phones can typically calculate location 
to within ten meters22 and will become more accurate in the near future.23  
However, tracking with GPS technology has certain limitations.  Whether a 
phone transmits GPS data depends on the network and on the phone’s 
applications that use GPS.24  A user can disable her phone’s GPS, and 
because GPS currently requires a “view” of the satellites, it can be 
unreliable indoors.25 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19. Global Positioning System Factsheet, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=119. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The FCC requires all phones to be GPS-enabled to facilitate emergency location 
under Enhanced 911 Phase II. See Enhanced 911, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://aboutus.
verizonwireless.com/wirelessissues/enhanced911.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 22. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14 (2010) [hereinafter Blaze Testimony], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.PDF (statement of Matt 
Blaze, Professor, University of Pennsylvania). 
 23. Potential near-future developments include GPS III satellites capable of three times 
the accuracy. Press Release, Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Team Completes Design 
Milestone for GPS III Program (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/
us/news/press-releases/2011/july/gps3-sdr.html. 
 24. Blaze Testimony, supra note 22, at 22.  Some applications will use GPS information 
to search for nearby restaurants, for instance. Id. at 21–22. 
 25. Id. at 22. 
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2.  Cell-Site Location Information 
Phones can also be tracked using cell-site location information (CSLI).  
Cellular service providers have a network of base stations (cell phone 
towers) spread throughout their coverage area.26  Any phone with service 
will be within range of at least one tower.27  Most users will be within range 
of multiple base stations and, in urban areas, they can be so densely packed 
that one base station may only cover a building or just an individual floor.28  
By calculating the time and angle at which cell phone signals reach three 
towers (a process called triangulation), service providers can track cell 
phone location to within fifty meters.29  As technology becomes more 
accurate,30 the distinction between “high accuracy” GPS and “low 
accuracy” CSLI will be effectively eliminated.31 
CSLI requires no special device capability, cannot be disabled by the 
user, and is collected and analyzed at the providers’ base stations rather 
than on the device itself.32  All providers record this location information 
when a phone sends and receives text messages and at the beginning and 
end of each call, but many providers also periodically collect it for various 
business purposes without any action by the user.33 
3.  Cell Phone Tracking By Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement officers primarily use three types of cell phone tracking 
information:  historical CSLI, real-time CSLI, and GPS.  In a request for 
historical CSLI, the government will ask the court to order a service 
provider to turn over the records of a consumer’s location recorded in the 
ordinary course of business.34  The information in these records is 
increasingly precise, and it is recorded frequently.35  Officers can also 
acquire a court order to obtain prospective CSLI in real-time or upon 
request, which allows for minute-to-minute tracking.36  New technology 
 
 26. Id. at 23. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
 29. See id. at 26. 
 30. Id. at 29. (“For a typical user, over that time, [CSLI] will likely have a locational 
precision similar to that of GPS.”) 
 31. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
[hereinafter Judge Smith Op.]. 
 32. See Blaze Testimony, supra note 22, at 22. 
 33. See id. at 27.  Providers are collecting information for two reasons:  (1) in response 
to Congressional and FCC directives to enhance the Emergency 911 system, and (2) to help 
determine where improvements to their infrastructure are needed. See Judge Smith Op., 747 
F. Supp. 2d at 833; Blaze Testimony, supra note 22, at 27.  Cell phones register or 
“handshake” with towers approximately eight times a minute, and each “handshake” can be 
recorded. David H. Goetz, Note, Locating Location Privacy, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 823, 
837 (2011). 
 34. See Judge Smith Op., 747 F. Supp. 2d at 829–30.  Data can include not just the 
sector, but the phone’s latitude and longitude.  A record of texts and calls would provide 
twenty to fifty-five location points a day. Id. at 835. 
 35. Id. at 833. 
 36. Id. 835–36. 
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allows the police to obtain CSLI on their own, without compelling service 
providers.37  These mobile “stingray” devices can mimic cell phone towers 
and ping38 a phone to reveal its location.39 
For GPS, the court will order a provider to ping a phone at times or 
intervals specified by the officers.40  The ping directs the device to calculate 
its location and send it to the provider, which forwards it to the officers.41  
Orders authorizing tracking are usually accompanied by a gag order 
preventing the service provider from notifying consumers that the 
government is accessing their location information.42  Because the records 
are routinely placed under indefinite seal, neither the target nor the public 
knows of the surveillance.43 
This Note will group the above technologies into two categories.  The 
first is precise, persistent tracking, which allows the police to determine, at 
small intervals, the subject’s exact location to within a few meters or less.  
Both GPS and CSLI are now capable of such tracking.  The second 
category is imprecise, intermittent tracking, which allows the police to 
determine the subject’s location within several hundred meters.  It only 
documents the subject’s position when he calls or texts.  The law 
surrounding each of these uses will be discussed in Part I.B.4.c.44 
B.  Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.45 
 
 37. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, “Stingray” Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2011, at A1. 
 38. A “ping” is a signal sent to a device that causes it to respond. Id. 
 39. Id.  These devices are called “stingrays” or “triggerfish.” Id.  The law on these 
devices is murky. See id. See generally William Curtiss, Note, Triggering A Closer Review:  
Direct Acquisition of Cell Site Location Tracking Information and the Argument for 
Consistency Across Statutory Regimes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 139 (2011) 
(examining “the unique legal and practical implications of the use of triggerfish” and arguing 
that their use should require a showing of probable cause). 
 40. Specified Wireless Tel., No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 
3, 2011). 
 41. Id. at *1. 
 42. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 80 (2010) [hereinafter Smith Testimony], 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.PDF 
(statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Many of the cases discussed involve imprecise, intermittent tracking, but this Note 
only evaluates precise, persistent tracking to facilitate arrest. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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The first clause protects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
conducted without a warrant.46  The second regulates warrants, requiring 
that they be based on probable cause and supported by a sworn affidavit.47  
Warrants must also describe with particularity both the place to be searched 
and the persons or things to be seized.48  For a police practice to violate the 
first clause, it must be a search and that search must be unreasonable.49  
This section explores developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as 
it adapts to new surveillance technology. 
1.  The History of Restrictions on Unreasonable Searches 
The primary aim of the Fourth Amendment was to eliminate the colonial 
“general warrant,”50 which gave customs officials broad authority to search 
for contraband anywhere, including private homes.51  Until the 1960s, 
property rights largely determined the reasonableness of a search:  if the 
government trespassed on property, then the search was unreasonable.52  
The protection extended as much to private papers as to the home, but was 
limited to areas and objects in which a person had a property interest.53 
2.  Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In Katz v. United States,54 the Supreme Court rejected the exclusively 
property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment, ruling that it 
“protects people, not places.”55  In his concurrence, Justice Harlan 
formulated a two-prong test to determine constitutional protection56 that 
became the standard analysis in subsequent cases applying Katz.57  Under 
Justice Harlan’s test, a person must (1) have “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) society must be prepared to 
 
 46. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 47. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). 
 48. Id. An arrest is the seizure of a person. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 
(1968). 
 49. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. 
 50. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). 
 51. See id.  Not just an instrument of colonial oppression, general warrants had been 
used in Britain since the Tudors, until they were condemned by British courts and the House 
of Commons in the 1760s. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886). 
 52. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th 
century.”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. In British and American common law, “every invasion of 
private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.” Id. at 627. 
 53. See Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”:  An 
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1084 (1987). 
 54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 55. Id. at 351.  As the Court explained in Jones, Katz expanded Fourth Amendment 
protection—it did not replace the property-based test. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (citing 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969) (“Nor do we believe that Katz, by 
holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was 
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home.”)). 
 56. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 57. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 54 n.121 (2006). 
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recognize that expectation as reasonable.58  Recent decisions, however, 
often subordinate the first prong or ignore it outright.59 
3.  What Expectations Are Reasonable? 
Court determinations of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy are notoriously unpredictable.60  Orin Kerr’s article, Four Models 
of Fourth Amendment Protection,61 is a helpful guide through this jungle.  
Kerr breaks Supreme Court decisions into four “distinct but coexisting 
approaches.”62  These models each consider different factors because, Kerr 
observes, no single test can accurately determine which police practices are 
reasonable on every set of facts.63 
The four models he suggests are the probabilistic model, the private facts 
model, the positive law model, and the policy model.64  The probabilistic 
model assesses the likelihood that a person or place would be observed.65  
A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the odds are high 
that “others will not successfully pry into his affairs.”66  For example, 
squeezing soft luggage to search for narcotics is a search, because a person 
does not expect his bag to be handled in an exploratory manner.67 
The private facts model considers the information that the government 
collects rather than the methods used to procure it.68  Even though people 
have an expectation of privacy in their mail, a chemical field test for 
narcotics is not a search, because it reveals nothing more than whether a 
package contains narcotics.69  The private facts model is often applied to 
cases involving new technologies.70 
 
 58. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 59. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1(c) (4th ed. 2011) (“[L]ittle 
attention has been given to the independent significance of the first factor or to precisely 
how it is to be interpreted.”); Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search:  
Intrusiveness and the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (2010) 
(“Increasingly, significant analysis of the first prong of the Katz test is noticeably absent 
from the Court’s search jurisprudence.”). 
 60. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 2.1(b) (“[I]t can hardly be said that the Court produced 
clarity where theretofore there had been uncertainty.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 349 (1974) (“For clarity and 
consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court’s most successful 
product.”). 
 61. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 
(2007). 
 62. See id. at 506. 
 63. Id. at 525. 
 64. Id. at 506. 
 65. See id. at 508. 
 66. See id. 508–09. 
 67. See id. at 509 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000)). 
 68. See Kerr, supra note 61, at 512–13. 
 69. See id. at 513 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)); see also 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding constitutional the use of drug 
sniffing dogs on luggage). 
 70. See Kerr, supra note 61, at 543. 
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The positive law model asks if the government violated some law to 
obtain information.71  This inquiry often resembles pre-Katz property-based 
Fourth Amendment analysis, but the Court does apply it in other contexts.72  
For instance, the government is permitted to fly a helicopter at low altitude 
over a defendant’s house if flying at such altitudes is legal for private 
citizens.73 
The policy model weighs the cost to civil liberties against the 
consequences of restricting police investigative power.74  While the policy 
model is often invoked explicitly, Kerr suggests that it also implicitly 
guides many decisions that apply the other models.75  Policy model cases 
employ overtly normative arguments.76  For example, in holding that 
pointing a thermal imaging device at a house to detect marijuana plants was 
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that sense-enhancing technologies 
threatened to erode privacy in the home over the long term.77 
These four models often overlap as judges jump between them while 
making arguments.78  In difficult cases, different models will often point 
judges in different directions.79  In Kerr’s view, a court’s challenge is not 
just to determine whether a model justifies a specific result, but why some 
models should be used and others discarded in a particular case. 
4.  Privacy in Location and Movement 
Analysis of Katz jurisprudence is difficult without reference to certain 
facts.  Therefore, this section considers the application of the Katz test to 
electronic surveillance.   
a.  Electronic Location Surveillance and the Supreme Court 
The first Supreme Court case to address electronic location surveillance 
was United States v. Knotts.80  In Knotts, the police placed a beeper in a 
five-gallon drum of chloroform.81  One of the defendants bought the drum, 
put it in his car, and drove toward a remote cabin.82  During the drive, the 
officers maintained visual surveillance until the defendants began evasive 
maneuvers.83  The police tracked them to the cabin using the beeper, then 
 
 71. Id. at 516. 
 72. See id. at 516–17. 
 73. Id. at 517 (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989)). 
 74. See Kerr, supra note 61, at 519. 
 75. Id. (“[T]he policy model presumably plays a guiding hand in many cases even when 
an opinion itself is framed in terms of the probabilistic model, private facts model, and/or 
positive law model.”). 
 76. See id. at 520. 
 77. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
 78. See Kerr, supra note 61, at 524. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 277 (“A beeper is a radio transmitter . . . which emits periodic signals that can 
be picked up by a radio receiver.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 278. 
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visually surveilled the property for three days before obtaining a search 
warrant.84  The Court ruled that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on 
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”85  Employing a private facts 
analysis, the Court reasoned that such a person voluntarily conveys the 
details of his journey to anyone who wants to observe.86  The beeper was a 
“scientific enhancement,” but it was closely analogous to visual 
surveillance.87 
In United States v. Karo,88 agents used the same technique to track a 
defendant carrying a drum of ether.89  Unlike Knotts, the agents monitored 
the beeper for days as it was brought inside one defendant’s home, then 
another, and finally to a commercial storage facility.90  The Court held that 
entering the home was a search, even though a beeper was less intrusive 
than physical entry.91  The beeper revealed a critical fact about the interior 
that the agents wanted to know and would not have known otherwise92:  the 
home contained a drum of ether.  The government argued that this 
requirement would create the need to obtain warrants in all cases, because 
officers could never predict whether a beeper would enter private premises 
during tracking.93  The Court was unsympathetic,94 but limited it’s analysis 
to when a beeper reveals it is in a particular private place.95  When the 
police tracked the beeper to the storage facility full of private lockers, they 
could not identify the particular locker containing the beeper.96  In that 
instance, the Court concluded that tracking the beeper was not a search, 
because the tracking did not intrude on the subject’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the locker.97 
In Kyllo v. United States,98 the Court further reinforced Fourth 
Amendment protection of the home.99  Use of extrasensory technology that 
reveals information about the inside of a house is a search, even if the 
information is observed from outside its walls;100 any detail of the home is 
 
 84. Id. at 278–79. 
 85. Id. at 281. 
 86. Id. at 281–82. 
 87. See id. at 285 (“A police car following [the defendant] at a distance throughout 
his journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the 
cabin . . . .”). 
 88. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 89. See id. at 708. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 714–15. 
 92. Id. at 715. 
 93. Id. at 718. 
 94. See id. (“The argument that a warrant requirement would oblige the government to 
obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a compelling argument against the 
requirement.”). 
 95. See id. at 720. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 720 n.6. 
 98. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 99. Id. at 34. 
 100. See id. at 34–36.  In private homes, citizens must retain the same privacy from 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Id. at 34. 
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an intimate detail, no matter how seemingly trivial.101  Kyllo further held 
that courts should take into account future developments when crafting 
rules to fit new technology.102 
b.  Privacy in Movement over Time:  GPS Tracking of Automobiles 
The Supreme Court most recently considered the constitutionality of 
electronic surveillance in United States v. Jones.103  Prior to Jones, the 
federal circuits had split on whether the attachment of a GPS device to a 
suspect’s vehicle and the monitoring of its movement on public streets 
constituted a search.104  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits found that GPS 
tracking was analogous to the beeper tracking in Knotts.105  The D.C. 
Circuit, however, found that GPS tracking was a search because it grants 
the government the ability to track the entirety of a person’s movements for 
weeks.106  While cell phone tracking is factually distinct because phones 
can enter the home, both issues potentially involve the same question:  does 
the aggregation of information make a police practice more intrusive over 
time, or should long-term surveillance be treated the same as short-term 
surveillance? 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits ruled that GPS technology, like the 
beeper before it, simply makes existing police techniques more efficient.107 
Under Knotts, a car’s whereabouts on public roads can be tracked because 
they are willingly exposed to the public.108  Neither court found that GPS 
tracking was different enough from the use of a beeper to warrant a 
departure from Knotts.109  The Eighth Circuit agreed, but limited its 
holding:  a warrant is not required when the police have reasonable 
suspicion that a particular vehicle is transporting drugs, and the device 
should only be attached for a reasonable period of time.110 
In United States v. Maynard,111 the D.C. Circuit departed from this 
consensus, holding that prolonged, extensive GPS surveillance on public 
 
 101. Id. at 37. 
 102. See id. at 36. 
 103. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). This section is indebted to Kaitlyn Kerrane’s Note on the 
issue, published in Volume 79 of the Fordham Law Review. Kaitlyn A. Kerrane, Note, 
Keeping Up with Officer Jones:  A Comprehensive Look at the Fourth Amendment and GPS 
Surveillance, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695 (2011). 
 104. Kerrane, supra note 103, at 1699. 
 105. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 106. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 671 (2010), and aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
 107. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
 108. Kerrane, supra note 103, at 1723.  This public exposure analysis resembles Kerr’s 
“private facts” model of Fourth Amendment privacy. See supra notes 68–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 109. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
 110. See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).  Both the Seventh 
and Eighth circuits explained that their holdings would not support a regime of mass 
surveillance. Id.; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 111. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), and aff’d in part 
sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
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roads is a search.112  The court distinguished Knotts, writing that month-
long GPS tracking exposes the totality of a person’s movements in a way 
that cannot be equated to the visual surveillance of a car during a single 
trip.113  While a single trip can be visually surveilled, there is no likelihood 
that anyone will observe a full month of movements.114  Maynard also 
considered whether one’s movements over the course of a month are 
“constructively exposed” because each individual movement is in public 
view.115  The court held that the whole of a person’s movements are not 
constructively exposed, because the whole of a person’s movements reveals 
more than the sum of its parts.116  Drawing from other areas of law, the 
court applied the “mosaic theory” to the Fourth Amendment.117  Under the 
mosaic theory, long-term surveillance is a search because it reveals intimate 
details of a person’s life that she reasonably expects no one to observe.118  
The court also distinguished GPS from prolonged visual or photographic 
surveillance.119  These traditional methods of surveillance require 
significant police resources, and this functions as a natural check on 
government overreach.120 
The Supreme Court heard Maynard on appeal as Jones.  The Court 
unanimously held that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle and 
monitoring its movement on public streets constituted a search.121  The 
majority decided only that a search occurs when the government trespasses 
on an individual’s property for the purpose of gathering information.122  It 
left unanswered the question that had split the circuits:  whether such 
tracking would be a search absent a physical trespass.  Five justices, 
however, appeared open to holding that extended tracking is a search even 
if the government makes no physical contact with an individual’s 
property.123 
Justice Alito, writing for four concurring justices, criticized the majority 
for relying on “18th-century tort law.”124  He suggested that reasonable 
 
 112. Id. at 563. 
 113. Id. at 558. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 560–62. 
 116. Id. at 562. 
 117. Id. at 562 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)).  The mosaic theory is 
taken from the government’s argument in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), and other cases 
involving national security information.  The government had argued that it could not reveal 
seemingly innocuous details because foreign intelligence agencies can assemble useful 
information from the bits and pieces. Id. at 178–79. 
 118. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 119. Id. at 565. 
 120. Id.  The court likened this distinction to the different approaches the U.S. Supreme 
Court has taken to warrantless recording of conversations. Id. at 566.  If the police plant an 
undercover agent, such recording is permitted. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429, 
440 (1963).  The police cannot, however, wiretap a phone without a warrant. See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 121. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 122. Id. at 951 n.5. 
 123. See infra notes 132–36 and accompanying text.  The five are Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
 124. Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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expectation of privacy should be the sole test used in the case.125  Applying 
this standard, he found that the long-term monitoring at issue was a 
search.126  He wrote that while short-term monitoring of movements on 
public streets is acceptable, longer-term monitoring “impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”127  He emphasized, that in the past, privacy was 
protected more by technological and practical limitations than by 
constitutional protection.128  Society expects that the government will not 
continually track movements for longs period because it was impossible to 
do so in the past.129  In Justice Alito’s view, that expectation should be 
protected against technological advances.130  The concurrence did not 
consider at what point monitoring becomes a search, only that four weeks 
“surely crossed” the line.131 
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion applying the 
trespassory test, but wrote a separate opinion signaling a willingness to 
apply Justice Alito’s analysis in a future case.132  She characterized the 
trespassory test as an “irreducible constitutional minimum” and found it 
sufficient to decide the case.133  While she rejected Justice Alito’s 
contention that a trespassory analysis should not apply, she agreed that long 
term monitoring impinges on a reasonable expectation of privacy.134  She 
wrote that GPS surveillance allows police to gather a wealth of personal 
data and to mine it for years.135  Because tracking is cheap and 
surreptitious, it is not subject to the ordinary checks on police power:  
community hostility and a lack of resources.136 
It now appears that at least five justices stand ready to rule that prolonged 
tracking is a search.137  Several commentators have concluded that the 
Court will endorse some version of the D.C. circuit’s mosaic theory.138  
Until then, however, the state of the law remains unclear.139 
 
 125. Id. at 958 (“[The trespassory test] strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it 
has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.  I 
would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the 
vehicle he drove.”). 
 126. Id. at 949. 
 127. Id. at 964. 
 128. Id. at 963. (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of 
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”). 
 129. Id. at 964. (“For such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement 
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor 
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 138. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032821 (“The 
concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a majority of the Supreme 
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c.  Privacy and Cell Phone Tracking 
Several courts have considered warrantless cell phone tracking in 
criminal investigations.  Because those cases consider tracking absent any 
showing of probable cause, they are not directly related to this Note’s core 
issue, but they are useful for understanding how courts view the privacy 
issues raised by cell phone tracking. 
When considering cell phone tracking, many courts have focused on 
statutory, rather than constitutional, questions.  Under federal statute, the 
government must apply for court orders compelling service providers to 
disclose customer-tracking data.140  Some disclosures require probable 
cause, others a lesser showing; if no federal statute authorized a court order 
on less than probable cause, a court could reject the government’s 
application on statutory grounds, without need to discuss the 
Constitution.141  Under federal law, there are several categories of 
surveillance.142  For the least invasive surveillance, like pen registers,143 the 
application must only certify that the information likely to be obtained is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.144  Under the Stored 
Communication Act,145 access to stored communications, such as 
subscriber information or account records, requires “specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records 
sought are “relevant and material.”146  Search warrants, including those for 
 
Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Tom 
Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-privacy Decision Than Most Thought 
(Conclusion Slightly Revised Jan. 31), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM),    
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/why-jones-is-still-less-of-a-pro-privacy-decision-than-
most-thought (“[T]here was seemingly a majority for a more consequential decision holding 
that long-term monitoring (even by non-physical means) is a search requiring a warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 139. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 394 (D. Md. 2012) (“[I]t appears 
as though a five justice majority is willing to accept the principle that government 
surveillance over time can implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
However . . . the factual differences between the GPS technology considered in the Jones 
case and the historical cell site location data in the present case lead this Court to proceed 
with caution in extrapolating too far from the Supreme Court’s varied opinions in Jones.”). 
 140. See In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Third Circuit CSLI Op.] 
 141. See Smith Testimony, supra note 42, at 82–84 (discussing various magistrate 
decisions considering the applicable statutes).  By contrast, the Constitution itself provides 
the primary check on actions police can take without a court order. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968).  “Triggerfish” can eliminate the need to compel service providers, but 
they are a recent development. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 142. See In re U.S. for and Order:  (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace 
Device, (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., (3) Authorizing Disclosure of 
Location-Based Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 572 (W.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 
W.D. Tex. Op.]. 
 143. Pen registers are devices installed at a phone company’s office that record the 
numbers dialed from a particular telephone. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 
(1979). 
 144. 2010 W.D. Tex. Op., 727 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006). 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
 146. Id. 
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location tracking, require a showing of probable cause.147  They may only 
be issued for: (1) evidence of a crime; (2) contraband or fruits of the crime; 
(3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a 
crime; or (4) a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully 
restrained.148  Even if surveillance falls under a statute requiring less than 
probable cause, a court can deny an application on constitutional 
grounds.149 
Courts have considered three kinds of cell phone tracking:  prospective 
CSLI, historical CSLI, and GPS.150  The first opinions discussing real-time 
CSLI began surfacing in 2005.151  Between 2005 and 2010, the government 
requested only imprecise, intermittent tracking without showing probable 
cause.152  These requests sought information from single cell towers, which 
could only place users within several hundred feet.153  The CSLI opinions 
from this period primarily grappled with statutory questions rather than the 
Fourth Amendment.154  Other magistrate opinions, as well as a few district 
court opinions, surfaced over the next several years.155  A majority have 
held that no federal statute authorizes a less-than-probable-cause 
standard.156  One judge went further, holding that CSLI violates the Fourth 
Amendment.157  A minority of courts held that federal statute allowed a 
limited form of CSLI:  imprecise158 location tracking, but only when the 
target made and received calls.159  The first opinion to adopt this minority 
view explained that an interaction between three statutes160 allows ongoing 
 
 147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d). 
 148. Id. at R. 41(c).  This rule tracks the constitutional analysis of Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967). See infra notes 267–70 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d 304, 318–19 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that, for a 
magistrate judge to determine whether tracking would reveal information implicating the 
Fourth Amendment, he or she must be able to determine what information would be 
disclosed to the government). 
 150. See supra Part I.A. 
 151. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records & 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) [hereinafter 2005 S.D.N.Y. Opinion]; In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with 
Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 152. See, e.g., Brief for United States at 7, Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d 304 (No. 08-
4227), 2009 WL 3866618 (requesting historical CSLI records). 
 153. See, e.g., Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d at 311; 2010 W.D. Tex. Op., 727 F. Supp. 
2d 571, 578 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
 154. See Smith Testimony, supra note 42, at 82–83. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. at 6; See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 
2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 157. See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register & 
Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone 
Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“The constitutional problems created 
by the [CSLI tracking] are the same, regardless of the breadth of the cell site data sought in a 
given case.”). 
 158. See 2005 S.D.N.Y. Opinion, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[N]o data is 
provided that could be “triangulated” to permit the precise location of the cell phone user.”). 
 159. See Smith Testimony, supra note 42, at 84. 
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. V 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 1002 
(2006). 
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CSLI.161  This approach became known as the “hybrid theory.”162  The 
hybrid theory opinions that considered the Constitution163 ruled that the 
requested CSLI was too imprecise to implicate the Fourth Amendment.164 
In 2010, the Third Circuit weighed in on historical CSLI.165  To date, it is 
the only federal court of appeals to consider the matter.  In re United States 
for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to 
Disclose Records to Government166 (Electronic Communication Service) 
held that the Stored Communications Act allows a court to issue an order 
for CSLI based on a showing of less than probable cause,167 but that the 
language of the statute does not prevent a magistrate judge from refusing 
certain requests on constitutional grounds.168  It remanded the case, 
requiring that the magistrate provide a full finding of fact before ruling that 
a probable cause showing was required.169 
After the Third Circuit decision, several magistrates held that imprecise, 
intermittent cell phone tracking is unconstitutional.  A district judge in the 
Southern District of Texas has since affirmed one such opinion, written by 
Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith.170  Judge Smith cited Maynard 
extensively and held that the differences between CSLI and automobile 
 
 161. See 2005 S.D.N.Y. Op., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 162. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register & Trap & 
Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 163. One decision refused to consider the Constitution during the application stage, 
writing that potential privacy violations from the requested CSLI could be raised in a motion 
to suppress if the target were indicted. In re U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 164. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register & Trap & 
Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 208; In re U.S. For an Order:  (1) Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing the 
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (W.D. 
La. 2006). 
 165. Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2010).  Some courts have held 
that requests for historical CSLI should be granted more liberally than real-time CSLI, 
because historical CSLI is more in line with Congressional intent in passing the Stored 
Communications Act. See In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  Other courts have held that real-time and 
historical CSLI should be treated identically. In re U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell 
Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459.  The Third Circuit 
seems to suggest its holding applies to both. Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d at 315 (“[T]he 
protections that Congress adopted for CSLI . . . have no apparent relevance to [the Stored 
Communications Act], and the legislative history does not show that Congress intended to 
exclude CSLI or other location information from [the Stored Communications Act].”).  To 
the extent the two are factually distinct, real-time CSLI is more relevant to the topic of this 
Note. 
 166. 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 167. Id. at 315.  The court discussed—but did not adopt—the hybrid theory. Id. at 310 
n.6. 
 168. Id. at 317.  The court also considered the third-party doctrine, discussed infra Part 
I.B.5. 
 169. Id. at 319. 
 170. Judge Smith Op., 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010).  The district court affirmed 
the magistrate’s opinion in one page. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-MC-
223 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/hughesorder1116.pdf. 
506 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
GPS tracking do not merit a different result.171  He found that CSLI is more 
invasive than GPS because it is equally accurate and can be monitored 
indoors where the expectation of privacy is highest.172  CSLI also reveals 
more than vehicular GPS because cell phones are on the subject’s person.173 
In at least one case, the government has applied for precise CSLI.174  The 
magistrate rejected that application.175  To date, no published magistrate 
opinion has approved the use of CSLI that would allow the government to 
precisely track the movements of a target.176 
5.  Third-Party Doctrine 
A person who voluntarily discloses information to a third party loses 
Fourth Amendment protection of that information.  If cell phone location 
information falls within this “third-party doctrine,” government acquisition 
of that information is not a search.  The third-party doctrine applies even if 
the subject assumed the information would only be used for limited 
purposes.  However, the Supreme Court decisions that established the third-
party doctrine are decades old, and it is unclear how the doctrine applies to 
twenty-first century technology.  This section traces the history of the third-
party doctrine from its origins to its current application to cell phones. 
a.  Origins of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Miller177 that individuals 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records.178  The 
Court relied on a line of cases challenging the admissibility of statements 
made to supposed friends and colleagues who later turned out to be 
government informants.179  In Miller, federal investigators had, without a 
warrant, subpoenaed the defendant’s bank records, which revealed he had 
written checks to buy equipment used to distill black-market whiskey.180  
The Court observed that the checks were not confidential communications 
but negotiable instruments containing information voluntarily conveyed to 
 
 171. Judge Smith Op., 747 F. Supp. 2d at 838–40.  Judge Smith explains two differences:  
First, automobile GPS is prospective data, and the historical CSLI was recorded. Id. at 839.  
Second, historical CSLI was “neither created nor maintained at the direction of law 
enforcement,” unlike GPS data. Id. 
 172. Id. at 840. 
 173. Id. 
 174. 2010 W.D. Tex. Op., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
 175. Id. at 574–75. 
 176. Most magistrate judges who have considered this subject have not issued public 
opinions. See Smith Testimony, supra note 42, at 84 n.20.  It is possible that, despite the 
absence of authority, some or even most magistrates approve precise CSLI. 
 177. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 178. Id. at 442. 
 179. Id. at 443.  The latest of these was United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  
White held that Katz did not protect a misplaced belief that the person he confides in will not 
reveal his wrongdoing. Id. at 751–52.  For an overview of these “Secret Agent Cases,” see 
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 567–69 (2009). 
 180. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38. 
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banks in the ordinary course of business.181  Miller ruled that by conveying 
information to another, an individual assumes the risk that the third party 
will provide that information to the government.182 
b.  Third-Party Doctrine and Electronic Surveillance:  Smith v. Maryland 
In Smith v. Maryland,183 the Court held that government use of pen 
registers is constitutional under the third-party doctrine.184  Officers had 
used a pen register installed at a phone company’s office to record the 
numbers that the suspect had dialed.185  The Smith Court doubted that 
people hold a subjective expectation of privacy in their dialed numbers, the 
first prong of the Katz test.186  The Court wrote that all subscribers realize 
they must convey numbers to the company to complete a call, and all 
realize that the company has facilities for making a permanent record of 
numbers dialed.187 
The Court acknowledged the limitations of this subjective test, noting 
that the government could destroy an actual expectation of privacy simply 
by announcing on national television that it no longer existed.188  If 
subjective expectations were made conditional, a normative inquiry would 
instead be proper.189  The Court did not actually entertain that argument; it 
ruled that Smith had no actual expectation of privacy.190 
Turning to the second prong of the Katz test, the Court ruled that any 
expectation of privacy in numbers dialed would be unreasonable.191  By 
exposing numerical information to the telephone company, Smith assumed 
the risk that the company would turn over that information to the 
government.192 
Smith argued that because companies do not make records of local calls 
for billing, they are not disclosed to the provider.193  The Court rejected this 
argument, refusing to “make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment” by 
basing its holding on the technicalities of a particular phone company’s 
billing practices.194  The Court observed that the automated switching 
equipment had taken the place of the human operators responsible for 
 
 181. Id. at 442. 
 182. Id. at 443. 
 183. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 184. Id. at 743–44.  Neither Smith nor Miller use the term “third-party doctrine,” but 
scholars have applied the name. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of 
the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011); Kerr, supra 
note 179. 
 185. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 186. Id. at 742. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 740 n.5. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 743. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 744. 
 193. Id. at 744–45. 
 194. Id. at 745. 
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routing calls.195  Smith had conceded that he would have no privacy in 
numbers conveyed to a human operator, and the Court determined that the 
company’s decision to automate should not create a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.196 
c.  Third-Party Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century 
Smith left open whether the third-party doctrine applies to surveillance 
technology that is more revealing than pen registers.197  While its analysis 
supports a broad application, the Smith Court emphasized the limitations of 
pen register technology and counseled that the specific nature of 
government activity is important.198 
Americans disclose much more information to third parties today than in 
1979, when Smith was decided.199  Recent cases have considered the 
privacy of information in email,200 text messages,201 Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) subscriber information,202 and Twitter accounts.203  There is 
little consensus on how to apply Smith and Miller to recent technological 
advances.  In City of Ontario v. Quon,204 the Supreme Court had a chance 
to clarify the debate, but it deferred.205  Rather than decide whether a city 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his text 
messages,206 the Court assumed arguendo that he did and decided the case 
on other grounds.207  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, cautioned 
the judiciary not to issue broad opinions about emerging technology before 
“its role in society has become clear.”208  He added that the ubiquity of cell 
phones could lead some to consider them necessary instruments for self-
identification and self-expression, which would strengthen the case for 
 
 195. Id. at 744. 
 196. Id. at 744–45. 
 197. Id. at 741–42.  The Court noted that the contents of a communication are protected 
by Katz. Id. at 741. 
 198. Id.  The Court explained that pen registers cannot hear sound, reveal the identities of 
the callers, or even determine whether the call was completed. Id.  It is unclear whether these 
capabilities would have affected the holding, or whether Smith or Katz applies to information 
less revealing than the contents of the conversation but more revealing than the numbers 
dialed. 
 199. See Henderson, supra note 184, at 40–44. 
 200. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 
828, 843–46 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011); 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 201. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 202. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008); Forrester, 512 
F.3d at 510. 
 203. In re for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. 
2011). 
 204. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 205. Id. at 2628–29. 
 206. The Fourth Amendment applies when the government is acting as an employer. Id. 
at 2627. 
 207. Id.  at 2628–29. The reversed Ninth Circuit decision contained an extensive third-
party doctrine analysis. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–08 (9th 
Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 208. Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2629. 
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protection.209  But such expectations could be tempered by clearly 
communicated policies from providers.210  While the Court evinced no 
opinion on Smith,211 one commentator heralded Quon as signaling the end 
of the “monolithic” third-party doctrine.212  This reaction was unsurprising, 
as opposition to the doctrine among commentators has been nearly 
unanimous.213 
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence criticized the third-party 
doctrine, calling it “ill suited to the digital age.”214  She expressed doubt 
that people would accept warrantless government monitoring of their web 
history just because it was disclosed to a third party for some limited 
purpose.215  To protect societal expectations, the Court would need to stop 
treating secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.216  Justice Sotomayor wrote 
only for herself and explained that deciding the third-party disclosure issue 
was unnecessary to resolve the case at hand.217  It remains an open question 
how the third-party doctrine applies in the digital age. 
Two federal circuits have applied the third-party doctrine to email.218  In 
United States v. Forrester,219 the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not protect sender and receiver email addresses.220  The 
court found to/from addresses analogous to the numbers dialed in Smith:  
they are used by providers for the specific purpose of routing information, 
they are voluntarily conveyed, and they do not necessarily reveal anything 
about the underlying communication.221  In United States v. Warshak,222 
the Sixth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment protected the contents of 
email.223  It emphasized the similarities between emails and letters.  
 
 209. Id. at 2630. 
 210. See id.  In Quon, the employer provided the phone. Id.  Justice Kennedy’s analysis 
may not apply if the provider has no employment relationship with the cell phone user. 
 211. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court did not set forth the governing 
principles necessary to answer the question. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 845 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 212. See Henderson, supra note 184, at 41.  Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, 
warned as much:  “[I]n saying why it is not saying more, the Court says much more than it 
should.” Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 213. See Kerr, supra note 179, at 564 (citing as examples 1 LAFAVE, supra note 59, 
§ 2.7(c), and Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s 
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005)). 
 214. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Forrester, 
512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 219. 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 220. Id. at 510.  The court also held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the IP 
addresses of the sites a user visits or a user’s total data usage. Id. 
 221. Id.  The language excludes information not used to “direct the third party’s servers.”  
See id.  The court explicitly reserved judgment on more intrusive or revealing techniques. Id. 
at 511. 
 222. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) 
 223. Id. at 285–86.  There were two Sixth Circuit Warshak cases, a 2008 civil case and a 
2010 criminal case. Casey Perry, Note, U.S. v. Warshak:  Will Fourth Amendment Protection 
Be Delivered to Your Inbox?, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 345, 357 n.58 (2011).  Each considered 
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Because the Fourth Amendment protects private communication, Warshak 
held that it must recognize nascent but important media of 
communication.224  Neither the ISP’s ability, nor its right, to access the 
email content affected the reasonable expectation of privacy.225  
Anticipating criticism, the Warshak court distinguished Miller.  First, 
simple business records are different than confidential communications.226  
Second, unlike the bank in Miller, the ISP was an intermediary, not the 
intended recipient of the emails.227 
From Quon, Forrester, and Warshak, it seems somewhat settled that 
Smith will not apply to the entirety of digital communication.  Smith 
remains strong as applied to information analogous to numbers dialed, and 
Miller remains strong as applied to information analogous to bank 
documents, but neither necessarily controls the wealth of new information 
disclosed to third parties in the digital age. 
d.  Third-Party Doctrine and Cell Phone Location 
Several cases have considered the third-party doctrine as it relates to cell 
phones.  Whether Smith controls cell phone location information depends in 
part on how police obtained the tracking information.228  If police cause the 
phone to emit location information through a GPS ping or other means, 
Smith likely does not apply.229  Smith more plausibly applies when police 
obtain information that the service provider ordinarily collects when the 
customer calls or texts.  Among circuit courts, only the Third Circuit has 
considered this issue.230 
Addressing the issue only briefly, Electronic Communication Service 
held that Smith does not apply to historical CSLI.231  The sharing was not 
voluntary, because cell phone customers are unlikely to realize that 
providers collect and store location information.232  Professor Susan 
Freiwald predicts that the holding will prove “significant and 
 
the application of the third-party doctrine to the contents of email. See id.  A panel in the 
civil case ruled that individuals had a privacy interest in their email, but the Sixth Circuit 
sitting en banc vacated the panel, holding that the issue was unripe for judicial resolution. 
Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  The Warshak 
decision discussed here is the 2010 criminal case. 
 224. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. 
 225. Id. at 287.  The court observed that in Katz, the phone company had the ability to 
listen in on conversations. Id.  It also had the legal right to listen to calls to protect itself 
against the illegal use of its facilities. Id.  Neither of these considerations gave the 
government the ability to listen without a warrant in Katz. See id. 
 226. Id. at 288. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005) 
(determining that Smith does not apply if police dial the subject’s cell phone to generate 
CSLI). 
 229. See id. 
 230. Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  This case was discussed supra 
Part I.B.4.c. 
 231. Third Circuit CSLI Op., 620 F.3d at 317. 
 232. Id. 
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influential,”233 but reliance on a lack of customer knowledge has made the 
precedent vulnerable.  For example, a federal judge in Oregon simply 
concluded that users were aware that companies retained these records.234  
A Louisiana state judge reached the same conclusion after hearing 
testimony from an AT&T employee that phone bills indicate the tower used 
to make calls and that the data is used in the ordinary course of business.235  
However, each holding only applied to historical records of imprecise 
location information.236  Only one court has fashioned an opinion that could 
apply to precise, persistent tracking.237  That court reasoned that pen 
registers recall mere “notes on a musical scale,” while location data is a 
“grand opera.”238  Professor Freiwald wrote that Smith should not apply to 
all information.239  Because location tracking exceeds the “limited 
capabilities” of pen registers, she argued that courts should employ full 
Katz analysis instead of reflexively applying Smith.240  This notion of a 
middle category between content contained within communications and 
“limited” information is novel and has not received much consideration by 
courts or commentators.241  The application of Smith to cell phone tracking 
remains an open question. 
C.  Warrants:  Requirements, Powers, and Exceptions 
The Constitution only prohibits unreasonable searches.242  Even if 
precise, persistent tracking constitutes a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, it may nevertheless be constitutional if it is reasonable.  
Several factors can make a search reasonable, but the primary and preferred 
method is a warrant supported by probable cause.243  Armed with an arrest 
or search warrant, police can reasonably intrude where they otherwise could 
not.  To acquire a warrant, law enforcement officers make a showing of 
 
 233. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:  A Question 
of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 684 (2011). 
 234. United States v. Davis, Crim. No. 10-339-HA, 2011 WL 2036463, at *3–4 (D. Or. 
May 24, 2011). 
 235. State v. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488, 509–10 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 236. In both, the records disclosed only contained information about a single tower used 
for each call, preventing triangulation. Davis, 2011 WL 2036463, at *4; Marinello, 49 So. 3d 
at 495. 
 237. Judge Smith Op., 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d In re U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-MC-223 (S.D. Tex, Nov. 11, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/hughesorder1116.pdf. 
 238. Id. at 846. 
 239. Freiwald, supra note 233, at 741–42. 
 240. Id. at 742. 
 241. As of the writing of this Note, no court or commentator has considered Professor 
Freiwald’s argument in depth, and the district court affirmed Judge Smith’s opinion only 
within the last year, on November 11, 2011. 
 242. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 243. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”). 
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probable cause to a magistrate, who authorizes a particular search or 
seizure.244 
This section covers several areas of Fourth Amendment warrant law in 
order to shed light on two issues discussed in Part II.  First, what are the 
requirements for a warrant to search for a person subject to arrest?  Second, 
does Payton, which allows police to enter the subject’s home without a 
search warrant to arrest the subject of an arrest warrant, also allow them to 
track the subject’s cell phone? 
1.  The Probable Cause Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment requires that the police have probable cause 
before executing a search or an arrest.245  Probable cause is a fluid concept:  
there are few general principles for determining whether a given set of facts 
establishes the quantum of evidence necessary to support probable cause.246  
Probable cause exists when the facts would lead a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that a crime has been, or is being, committed.247  It 
requires more than mere suspicion248 but “significantly lower quanta of 
proof” than necessary to establish guilt.249  The determination requires an 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances, operating with probabilities 
rather than certainties.250  The facts are viewed from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer, taking into account training and expertise.251  Courts 
determining probable cause require the same quantum of evidence for 
search and arrest warrants, even though each requires a showing of different 
facts and circumstances.252 
2.  Search Warrants and Arrest Warrants 
To procure an arrest warrant, police must have probable cause to believe 
that (1) an offense has been committed (2) by the person to be arrested.253  
For a search warrant, police must have probable cause to believe that (1) the 
items sought are seizable by virtue of their connection with criminal 
activity, and (2) the items will be found in the place to be searched.254  
There is no requirement that a search warrant name the person whose 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 3.1(a). 
 246. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 247. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
 248. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959). 
 249. United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307, 311–12 (1959)). 
 250. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–31 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949)). 
 251. See, e.g., Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. United States, 
302 F.2d 194, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp. 158, 164 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971), aff’d, 462 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 252. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 3.1(b) (citing Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 253. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a). 
 254. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 3.1(b). 
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property will be searched255 or persons potentially implicated by the 
search.256  Search warrants for tracking devices require a different 
showing.257  They must describe the object to be tracked, the circumstances 
that led agents to want to track the object, and the length of time for which 
surveillance is requested.258 
Because the interests protected by the two types of warrants differ, 
searches involve different procedural protections than arrests.259  
Warrantless arrests are judged by the same probable cause standard as arrest 
warrants, even if police had time to secure a warrant.260  By contrast, 
warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable . . . subject to only a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”261  Police 
inferences must be evaluated by neutral magistrates who, unlike the police, 
are not engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.”262  Officers can delay executing an arrest warrant while they 
continue to investigate a suspect,263 but search warrants for tracking devices 
must specify a reasonable time not exceeding forty-five days in which the 
device may be used.264  Officers executing a search warrant can only search 
for items particularly described in the warrant.265  They may only search 
areas that could plausibly contain the items sought.266 
In Warden v. Hayden, the Supreme Court held that officers may search 
for mere evidence of a crime in addition to instrumentalities, fruits of a 
crime, or contraband.267  The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment 
secures the same level of privacy if a search seeks mere evidence.268  Only 
 
 255. Id. (citing United States v. Besase, 521 F.2d 1306, 1308 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
 256. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 3.1(b) (quoting United States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934, 
941 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
 257. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).  Tracking warrants do not seek 
seizable items and cannot particularly describe a place to be searched. Id. 
 258. Id. (“[I]t will still be possible to describe the object into which the beeper is to be 
placed, the circumstances that led agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time 
for which beeper surveillance is requested.  In our view, this information will suffice to 
permit issuance of a warrant authorizing beeper installation and surveillance.”). 
 259. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1981). 
 260. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 
 261. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971). 
 262. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 263. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“Good police practice often requires postponing an arrest . . . to place the suspect under 
surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”); see 
also, e.g., Vafaiyan v. City Of Wichita Falls, Civil No. 7:06-CV-140-O, 2009 WL 3029782, 
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2009) (police delayed executing an arrest warrant and tailed a 
suspect for three days). 
 264. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).  This is not necessarily a constitutional requirement, 
however. 
 265. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 4.6(a) (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 
196 (1927)). 
 266. Id. § 4.10(d) (citing United States v. Chadwell, 427 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D. Del. 
1977)). 
 267. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967).  Search and seizure law had been 
closely tied to property. Id. at 303.  The government could seize instrumentalities, fruits of 
crime, or contraband because it had a superior property interest in those items. Id. at 303–04. 
 268. Id. at 306–07. 
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a nexus between the items and criminal activity is required.269  Put 
differently, officers must have probable cause to believe that the evidence 
will aid in apprehension or conviction.270  Officers can seize any 
incriminating objects they come across within the proper scope of the 
search warrant.271  While search warrants give officers broad power to 
search private spaces and seize incriminating items, this power is restricted 
to avoid raising the specter of a general warrant.272 
3.  Probable Cause to Search Arising from Probable Cause to Arrest 
Though the quantum of evidence required to secure a search and arrest 
warrant is the same, probable cause to believe that an individual has 
committed a crime will not alone support a search warrant.273  Police can 
have probable cause to arrest a person without having probable cause to 
search even the subject’s residence.274  However, if the nature of the crime 
supports an inference that instrumentalities or other evidence could be 
found in the subject’s residence, then a search warrant for that evidence will 
issue.275 
For tracking warrants, it is unclear what, if any, probable cause is 
required beyond the probable cause to believe that an individual has 
committed an offense.  The Supreme Court has given little guidance on this 
issue;276 however, the language of the federal wiretap statute may be 
instructive.277  Under the statute, a federal judge may issue a wiretap order 
if “such interception may provide or has provided evidence of” various 
crimes.278  From this language, it appears that tracking warrants, like all 
warrants, must still seek particular evidence with a nexus to the crime, even 
though they are not limited to a particular place. 
 
 269. Id. at 307. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (describing the “plain view” 
doctrine); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139 (1990) (noting that officers need 
not come inadvertently upon incriminating objects not described in the warrant). 
 272. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301; see also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text 
(discussing general warrants). 
 273. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 3.1(b) (“In our opinion an allegation . . . not supported 
by the facts is insufficient to support [an inference of] criminal activity in a premises, in spite 
of the fact that there are plenty of allegations alleged to relate to criminal activity of the 
individual who is alleged to have lived in the premises.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Kline, 
335 A.2d 361 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975))). 
 274. Id. 
 275. See United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (commenting that 
stolen cash is the type of loot criminals could hide in their homes); United States v. Lucarz, 
430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that the suspect had ample time to stash stolen 
envelopes at home); see also United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“The magistrate need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the 
place indicated in the affidavit.”). 
 276. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) advisory committee’s note (discussing United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984)). 
 277. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. V 2011).  The standards for wiretapping are quite 
restrictive. See id.  This comparison does not imply that tracking is or ought to be subject to 
the same restriction. 
 278. Id. 
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4.  Payton v. New York and the Power of the Arrest Warrant 
Police generally need a search warrant to enter a home, but under Payton, 
they can enter for the limited purpose of executing an arrest warrant.279  
Payton’s main holding prohibits the police from entering a home to perform 
a warrantless arrest.280  The Court also held that an arrest warrant carries 
the limited authority to enter the suspect’s dwelling when there is reason to 
believe the suspect is within.281 
Before making a Payton arrest, the police can look anywhere in the house 
where the arrestee might be found.282  They can also search near the suspect 
to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.283  Police can 
conduct a “protective sweep” of the home before or after the arrest.284  
Officers can inspect places from which an attack could be immediately 
launched, such as adjacent closets.285  They can search elsewhere if they 
have a reasonable belief that the area swept harbors an individual posing a 
danger to the officers or others.286  The subject of an arrest warrant cannot 
forestall a protective sweep by stepping outside the home and cooperating, 
if officers reasonably believe a person within presents a potential threat.287  
The sweep is not a full search, only a “cursory inspection” of certain spaces 
that ends once the reasonable suspicion has been dispelled.288  The police 
must have specific reasons to perform a broad sweep; mere absence of 
knowledge is insufficient justification.289  The dominant consideration is 
the seriousness of the crime being investigated.290  During a protective 
sweep, police can seize any evidence in “plain view.”291  Protective sweeps 
 
 279. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).  Police may make an arrest in a 
public place with or without a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). 
 280. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. 
 281. Id. at 602–03. 
 282. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 283. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 284. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.  The federal courts of appeal have split on the showing required under Payton’s 
“reason to believe” requirement.  The Ninth Circuit has held that reason to believe requires a 
showing equivalent to probable cause. United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2002).  Every other circuit to consider the issue has held that “reason to believe” 
requires some lesser showing. Michael A. Rabasca, Note, Payton v. New York:  Is “Reason 
to Believe” Probable Cause or a Lesser Standard?, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 437, 445 
(2009).  Most recently, the Sixth Circuit held that reasonable belief requires “looking at 
common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. 
Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 287. See People v. Neutzel, 246 A.D.2d 477, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 288. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. 
 289. See United States v. Moran Vargas, 376 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 777–78 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 290. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 6.4(c) (citing, e.g., United States v. Burrows, 48 F.3d 
1011 (7th Cir. 1995)).  Some level of individualized suspicion is always required.  There is 
no bright-line rule allowing protective sweeps when arresting violent criminals. Buie, 494 
U.S. at 334 n.2. 
 291. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). “If an article is already in plain 
view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy.” Id. at 
133. 
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are common, and the standard for justifying them is often low, but they are 
not an automatic feature of in-home arrests.292 
5.  Arrests in the Homes of Third Parties:  Steagald v. United States 
Soon after deciding Payton, the Court in Steagald v. United States293 
considered whether police executing an arrest warrant could enter the 
homes of third parties to arrest the subject of the warrant.294  The Court 
held that an arrest warrant is inadequate to protect the rights of third parties 
when their homes are searched.295  The officers’ reasonable belief that the 
suspect was in the third party’s home was insufficient to protect the 
homeowner’s procedural rights, because that belief was not subjected to 
“the detached scrutiny of a judicial officer.”296  A reasonable belief 
standard would create the potential for abuse for which the post facto 
remedy of suppression is inadequate.297  The Court observed that the 
magistrate requirement furthers the Fourth Amendment’s aim:  “to prevent, 
not simply to redress, unlawful police action.”298  With that in mind, 
Steagald required that police obtain a warrant to search the third party’s 
home for the subject of the arrest warrant.299  Like traditional search 
warrants, the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched.300 
The Court explicitly limited its holding to the rights of third parties, 
however.301  The Court did not extend the protection to the subject of the 
arrest warrant himself, who has no protection.302  Five circuits have held 
that Payton, not Steagald, applies to the subjects of arrest warrants when 
they are arrested in the homes of third parties.303 
II.  THE CLASH OF PERSPECTIVES OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
PRECISE, PERSISTENT TRACKING TO FACILITATE ARREST 
Part II examines the disagreement over whether police can use cell phone 
tracking to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant.  Part II.A examines 
Specified Wireless Telephone, a magistrate judge’s opinion holding that cell 
phone tracking violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, that search 
 
 292. See United States v. Schultz, 818 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that 
protective sweeps cannot be “standard procedure”). 
 293. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
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 295. Id. at 213. 
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 297. Id. at 215. 
 298. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969)). 
 299. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220–21. 
 300. See id. at 214 n.7. 
 301. Id. at 218–19. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Agnew, 
407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 
(6th Cir. 1983). 
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warrants for a suspect require probable cause to believe that the suspect is 
in a particular place, and that Payton does not authorize such tracking. 
Part II.B considers the opposite perspective.  It first analyzes Bermudez, 
in which a district court judge held that Payton justifies cell phone tracking 
if officers have an arrest warrant.  Part II.B also includes Professor Orin 
Kerr’s critique of Specified Wireless Telephone.  Kerr argues that cell phone 
tracking does not violate the Fourth Amendment, because cell phone 
location falls under the third-party doctrine and because individuals have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location or movements.  Even if 
the Fourth Amendment does extend to location information, Kerr maintains 
that Payton and Steagald authorize cell phone tracking when police have an 
arrest warrant. 
 
A.  Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest Is Held Unconstitutional:  
Specified Wireless Telephone 
On August 3, 2011, Magistrate Judge Gauvey, of the District of 
Maryland, issued the first and only opinion on the use of precise, persistent 
cell phone tracking to facilitate arrest:  Specified Wireless Telephone.304  
While the opinion is not binding precedent, it is notable as the first written 
consideration of the issue. 
1.  Procedural History 
On June 3, 2010, the United States applied for authorization to ascertain 
the physical location of the subject’s cell phone.305  The government asked 
for a GPS ping, along with CSLI for the start and end of any call when 
precise location was unavailable.306  At the time of the application, the 
defendant was unaware of the charges, and the police had not attempted to 
apprehend him.307  The government stipulated that the defendant’s location 
was not evidence of a crime, but that the “‘requested information [was] 
necessary to determine the location of [the subject] so that law enforcement 
officers may execute the arrest warrant [on him].’”308  The government 
asked for an order directing the carrier to acquire and disclose location data 
at specified times or upon the officers’ oral request.309  The requested 
access would last for thirty days.310 
The government’s request was denied, but the defendant was arrested a 
few days later.311  Though the government’s request was moot, Judge 
 
 304. Specified Wireless Tel., No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 
2011).  Because magistrates’ rulings need not be written, it is unlikely that Judge Gauvey has 
been the only magistrate to hear the issue.  Nevertheless, hers is the only written opinion. 
 305. Id. at *1. 
 306. Id.  For a description of the relevant technologies, see supra Part I.A. 
 307. Id. at *2. 
 308. Id. at *1 (quoting the government’s application). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at *2. 
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Gauvey noted the issue’s importance and invited further argument from the 
Office of the U.S. Attorney, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office 
of the Federal Public Defender. 
2.  Privacy in Location and Movement 
On August 3, 2011, Judge Gauvey issued an extensive opinion.312  To 
determine whether the requested tracking would be a search, the court first 
laid out the privacy interests at issue.313  While the government conceded 
that a subject of an arrest warrant has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
while in a non-public place, Specified Wireless Telephone went further, 
holding that the subject had a “reasonable expectation of privacy both in his 
location as revealed by real-time location data and in his movement where 
his location is subject to continuous tracking over an extended period of 
time, here thirty days.”314 
The Supreme Court held in Knotts that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in movements in public areas, regardless of whether 
surveillance is visual or electronic.315  Judge Gauvey distinguished cell 
phone observation from traditional methods because it allows the police “to 
locate a person entirely divorced from all visual observation.”316  When 
tracking a phone, officers will not know in advance whether the subject is 
located in a constitutionally protected place in violation of Kyllo,317 such as 
a home or even a particular room.318  Cell phone users keep their cell 
phones on or close to their person, so placing a cell phone is equivalent to 
placing its user.319 
Specified Wireless Telephone also held that the request for “unlimited 
location data at any time on demand during a thirty-day period” implicated 
the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement.320  The 
opinion discussed the circuit split over warrantless GPS monitoring of 
automobiles.321  While treating Maynard with seeming approval, Specified 
Wireless Telephone distinguished cell phone tracking.322  Unlike 
 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at *8. 
 314. Id. at *9. 
 315. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 318. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *9. 
 319. Id. at *10.  The opinion cites a Pew study finding that 65 percent of American adults 
have slept with their cell phone nearby. Amanda Lenhart, Cell Phones and American Adults, 
PEW INTERNET (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/
PIP_Adults_Cellphones_Report_2010.pdf. 
 320. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *11. 
 321. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *12.  See supra Part I.B.4.b. 
 322. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *12.  While clearly crafting an 
analysis to survive a reversal of Maynard, Specified Wireless Telephone does not mention 
the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in United States v. Jones in its Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  Jones is mentioned in the statutory analysis, which this Note does not discuss. Id. 
at *41. 
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automobiles, she wrote, it is “almost unimaginable” that a cell phone would 
remain entirely within public spaces.323 
3.  The Reasonability of Precise, Persistent Tracking to Facilitate Arrest 
Having decided that cell phone tracking constitutes a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Specified Wireless Telephone next 
considered whether an arrest warrant makes the search constitutionally 
reasonable.324  Relying on Payton, the government claimed that where a 
valid arrest warrant has been issued, it is entitled to “do what it takes to find 
and arrest the person.”325  Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to 
enter a home, it authorizes the lesser infringement of location tracking.326 
The court rejected this argument, holding that Payton requires the 
government to have a reasonable suspicion that the subject is in a particular 
place before making an entry.327  Specified Wireless Telephone read Payton 
as a “narrow exception” to the search warrant requirement that only applies 
if officers can demonstrate a reasonable belief that the suspect “lives at the 
place to be searched and is present within the place to be searched at the 
time of arrest.”328  Precise, persistent tracking allows officers to search 
anywhere for the defendant.329  The court reasoned that Steagald,330 which 
declined to extend the Payton holding to the homes of third parties, 
demonstrates that arrest warrants do not give police the ability to enter 
every dwelling in which they believe the subject is present.331 
Judge Gauvey observed that the Supreme Court has cited Payton 
seventy-eight times without expanding the holding or applying it to facts 
similar to those in Specified Wireless Telephone.332  The Court has 
generally used Payton to restrict, not affirm, police conduct.333  While 
several circuits have held that the subject of an arrest warrant cannot contest 
searches in the homes of third parties, such searches still require a 
reasonable belief that the subject is in a particular place.334  There is “no 
doctrinal bridge from the limited authority” to enter a home under Payton to 
the power to obtain “continuous location and movement data” for thirty 
days.335  Because tracking provides “different and arguably more” 
information than a place-based search, Judge Gauvey rejected the 
 
 323. Id. at *11–12. 
 324. See id. at *14. 
 325. Id. at *13. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at *14. 
 329. See id. at *17–18. 
 330. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
 331. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *15. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at *16. 
 334. Id. at *16–17 (citing United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2009)).  Only the owners of the homes can contest such searches. See supra notes 301–303. 
 335. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *17 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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government’s claim that cell phone tracking is a “lesser infringement of 
privacy.”336 
Even if the requested search were limited to “30 days or a reasonable 
period of time after location of the cell phone and its user to allow a safe 
arrest, whichever is shorter,” cell phone tracking still provides more 
information than a place-based warrant.337  The court observed that while 
entering a person’s home need not reveal much information, observing 
location data over an extended period reveals intimate details of a person’s 
life.338  Even a search warrant for data at a single moment, which would not 
implicate privacy of movement, risks invading the privacy of unidentified 
third parties.339  This reasoning reflects a particular concern with the 
investigative potential of cell phone tracking relative to standard Payton 
searches.340 
4.  Authority for a Search Warrant to Aid in Apprehension 
Having decided that cell phone tracking is a search and that Payton does 
not allow that search, the Specified Wireless Telephone court next 
considered whether the government had made the required showing of 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant.341  The government claimed it 
could demonstrate that it had probable cause to believe that the “evidence 
sought will aid in a particular apprehension.”342  The government read 
Hayden to suggest that law enforcement can use a search warrant to aid in 
the apprehension of a defendant without showing a nexus between criminal 
behavior and the suspect’s movements.343  The court, agreeing with the 
public defender, declared the cited language dicta, because the evidence in 
Hayden was used to convict, not apprehend, the defendant.344  Judge 
Gauvey highlighted alternate language:  “there must be a nexus . . . between 
the item to be seized and criminal behavior.”345  While Hayden allows 
searches for mere evidence, warrants “must still be specifically tailored to 
 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at *18. 
 339. Id.  Specified Wireless Telephone considered invading the privacy of third parties 
with cell phone tracking more severe than a place-based search because the individuals are 
not as readily identifiable. Id. 
 340. See id. at *18–19 (“A Payton search informs the government as to whether the 
subject of the arrest warrant is in his home or in another place that the government had 
probable cause to believe he is.  However, the search anticipated here informs the 
government on an almost continuous basis where the subject is, at places where the 
government lacked probable cause to believe he was, and with persons about whom the 
government may have no knowledge.”).  
 341. Id. at *24. 
 342. Id. at *26. 
 343. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *27.  The relevant language in 
Hayden:  “Thus in the case of ‘mere evidence,’ probable cause must be examined in terms of 
cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). 
 344. Specified Wireless Tel., 2011 WL 3423370, at *27.  
 345. Id. 
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permit search or seizure only of things and places that have a connection to 
the alleged criminal activity.”346 
The government can acquire a search warrant to apprehend a criminal 
defendant, but it must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant was in 
a particular place.347  The government could not request “broad 
information” about the defendant’s movements without proving a nexus 
between those movements and the crime itself.348  Such authority would be 
“akin to general investigatory activity, for which search warrants are not 
issued.”349 
In short, Specified Wireless Telephone denied the government’s 
application because precise persistent tracking violated the subject’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Judge Gauvey rejected the government’s 
two arguments:  that Payton justified tracking to facilitate arrest, or in the 
alternative, that a search warrant could issue where there was probable 
cause to believe that location information would aid in the apprehension of 
the subject. 
B.  Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest Is Constitutional 
This section examines the opposition to Specified Wireless Telephone.  It 
analyzes Bermudez, which held that imprecise tracking is allowed under 
Payton, and explains Orin Kerr’s criticism of Specified Wireless Telephone.   
1.  Applying Payton to CSLI:  United States v. Bermudez 
In 2006, five years before Judge Gauvey’s decision rejecting precise 
persistent tracking to facilitate arrest, Bermudez held that law enforcement 
could use CSLI to help apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant.350  In 
Bermudez, the police tracked a phone for less than one day using imprecise, 
intermittent tracking.351  The court held that Payton allowed cell phone 
tracking because it was a lesser intrusion into the home than physical 
entry.352  The court also held that tracking a cell phone to an area 
containing a home is constitutional so long as it does not reveal the 
particular home in which the phone is located.353  Lastly, the court held that 
the third-party doctrine allows police to call a phone and use its ring to 
locate it.354 
 
 346. Id. at *28. 
 347. Id. at *29–30. 
 348. Id. at *30. 
 349. Id. 
 350. United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *11 (S.D. 
Ind. June 30, 2006). 
 351. Id. at *1. 
 352. Id. at *10. 
 353. Id. at *12–13. 
 354. Id. at *13. 
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a.  Procedural History 
On May 9, 2005, police used real-time CSLI of a phone “believed to be 
used by or otherwise connected” to a fugitive and tracked the phone to an 
apartment he had rented.355  Later that day, officers surveilling the 
apartment noticed a car driven by two men, one of whom the officers 
believed to be the fugitive.  After observing suspicious behavior, the police 
stopped the men and arrested one of them, Amaral-Estrada, whom the 
police believed to be the fugitive.356 
The police then attempted a consent search of the fugitive’s apartment, 
which the fugitive’s mother and her husband, defendant Lira-Esquivel 
occupied.357  They called the phone they had been tracking, which was on a 
table in the apartment.358  Eventually, the police arrested both Lira-Esquivel 
and the fugitive’s mother.  The police did not charge the fugitive’s mother, 
but did charge Amaral-Estrada and Lira-Esquivel with conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute narcotics.359 
Defendant Lira-Esquivel moved to suppress evidence obtained from the 
apartment, alleging that the offers exceeded their authority under statute and 
the Constitution by tracking the cell phone located in his apartment.360 
b.  Application of Payton to Cell Phone Tracking 
Bermudez first considered whether Payton allowed cell phone tracking 
within a home.361  The court reasoned that because Payton gives police the 
authority to physically enter the home of the target, it also provides the 
authority to use less intrusive means to search for the person sought.362  
Therefore, the court determined that tracking a cell phone into a private 
space is less intrusive than a Payton search because it does not involve 
physical entry.363  The court did not consider whether the suspect could 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.364 
 
 355. Id. at *1.  The fugitive, Sosa-Verdeja, was not among those investigated or charged.  
The tracking was authorized by a court order issued May 3, 2005. Id.  A fugitive is one who 
could be or is charged with flight to evade prosecution or testimony under 18 U.S.C. § 1073 
(Supp. V 2011). Specified Wireless Tel., 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370, at *7 (D. Md. 
Aug. 3, 2011). 
 356. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, at *2–3. 
 357. Id. at *4. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at *5. 
 360. Id. at *6.  Lira-Esquivel also moved to suppress on statutory grounds.  The court 
held that the police had violated the Stored Communications Act and the Pen/Trap Act but 
that suppression was not an available remedy for violation of those statutes. Id. at *7–9. 
 361. Id. at *10–11. 
 362. Id. at *10. 
 363. See id. at *11. 
 364. Bermudez predated the circuit split over GPS tracking of automobiles. The Seventh 
Circuit subsequently ruled that tracking of automobile movements is not a search. United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).  The single day of imprecise, 
intermittent tracking at issue in Bermudez would probably not have been a search under 
Maynard. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560–63. (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining 
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c.  Constitutionality of Tracking a Cell Phone to a Home 
In the alternative, Lira-Esquivel argued that the fugitive’s cell phone had 
provided information about his dwelling that the police could not otherwise 
have obtained, in violation of Kyllo.365  The court disagreed.366  In Kyllo, 
officers targeted the home to gain information about the activities inside.367  
But in Bermudez, police targeted the phone only as to its location and 
learned only that the phone was in one of three apartment units in a 
building.368  And though the signal originated from the home, it could be 
monitored from outside without revealing information about the home 
itself.369 
In a footnote, Bermudez cites Karo for support.370  Because the building 
contained three apartments, it resembled Karo’s group of lockers.371  Police 
did not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy if they could not 
place the phone within a particular apartment.372  Bermudez also notes that 
Karo explicitly left open whether probable cause is required before 
monitoring a beeper in a private residence.373 
d.  Third-Party Doctrine 
Bermudez further concluded that at least some cell phone signals fell 
under the third-party doctrine.374  The court held that officers can call a 
phone and use its ring to determine its location, even within a home.375  
Because the phone’s signals were “knowingly exposed” to the cell phone 
company, a police officer could call it.  If one intends to keep a cell phone’s 
location private, he can just turn it off.376 
Bermudez only considered imprecise tracking for a short period, but its 
application of Payton contradicts Specified Wireless Telephone.  While 
Bermudez considered tracking less intrusive than a physical entry,377 unlike 
 
the difference between a whole month of tracking and the tracking of individual 
movements). 
 365. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, at *12.  The Court also held that Lira-Esquivel did 
not have standing to challenge the tracking of another person’s cell phone into his apartment. 
Id. at *11–12 (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004)). 
 366. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, at *13. 
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 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at *13 n.27. 
 371. See id. 
 372. See id. at *13. 
 373. Id. at *13 n.27. 
 374. Id. at *12–13. 
 375. Id.  There is some ambiguity as to whether the court is discussing the dialing or the 
tracking that preceded it.  Because only the ring actually placed the phone within the 
apartment, the court was likely considering the dialing. Id.  The judge also notes that the 
Sixth Circuit ruled that CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed in United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 
942, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004), and does not appear to contradict that holding. Bermudez, 2006 
WL 3197181, at *12–13. 
 376. Id. at *13. 
 377. See supra notes 361–64 and accompanying text. 
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Specified Wireless Telephone, it did not consider the information-gathering 
potential of cell phone tracking. 
2.  Orin Kerr’s Objections to Specified Wireless Telephone 
Soon after Specified Wireless Telephone was published, Orin Kerr posted 
a summary and critique of the opinion on the Volokh Conspiracy.378  
Calling the opinion “pretty clearly wrong,” he presented three arguments 
against it.379  Kerr argued that the third-party doctrine applies to cell phone 
location information, that there is no right to privacy in location or 
movement, and that Payton allows police to find a suspect’s phone.380 
a.  Third-Party Doctrine Applies to Cell Phone Location Information 
Kerr wrote that Smith v. Maryland applies to cell phone location 
information.381  CSLI is “closely analogous to the numbers dialed in 
Smith”382 because it is necessary for placing a call and is necessarily 
transmitted to the service provider.383  He argues that courts should 
presume that users know how their cell phones work, much as Smith 
presumed that users knew how landline telephones worked.384  In his view, 
it is basic knowledge that cell phones communicate with nearby cell towers 
to make calls, and failure to have this basic understanding of technology 
should not provide Fourth Amendment protection.385  He also observed that 
the percentage of users with this basic understanding constantly 
increases.386  In an earlier post, Kerr had noted that the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Warshak387 did not grant protection to CSLI.388  The panel 
opinion applied to the contents of an email, but Kerr categorized CSLI as a 
noncontent record.389  Because Kerr determined that Smith applies, he 
 
 378. Orin Kerr, Court Rules That Police Cannot Use Warrants to Obtain Cell Phone 
Location of Person Who is Subject of Arrest Warrant, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 8, 2011, 
8:36 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/08/08/court-rules-that-police-cannot-use-warrants-to-
obtain-cell-phone-location-of-person-who-is-subject-of-arrest-warrant/.  Kerr’s post provides 
links to some of his past arguments about cell phone tracking. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Orin Kerr, Legal Protection for Historical Cell-Site Records, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Feb. 3, 2010, 1:22 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/02/03/legal-protection-for-historical-cell-
site-records/ (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742). 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. See supra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
 388. Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Stunner:  Judge Rules That Cell-Site Data Protected 
by Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 31, 2010, 2:46 
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 389. Id.  Kerr also observed that the 2008 Warshak decision had been vacated.  He wrote 
before the 2010 Warshak decision, which also held that the contents of emails were 
protected. See supra note 223. 
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concluded that CSLI is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.390  Kerr’s 
analysis in this earlier post applied to the historical CSLI considered by the 
Third Circuit in Electronic Communication Service.391  By linking this 
analysis to his objection to Specified Wireless Telephone, Kerr implied that 
the same analysis applies to GPS pings and CSLI collected without the 
placement of a call. 
b.  The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Privacy in 
Location and Movement 
Kerr argued that courts should not deal in abstractions like privacy in 
location and movement.392  Instead, courts should ask “whether the 
particular data stored in a particular place on a particular server is 
protected.”393  He criticized Judge Gauvey for her overreliance on 
Maynard’s mosaic theory.394  In other posts, Kerr had argued that Maynard 
introduces a novel, unpersuasive theory of the Fourth Amendment.395  First, 
he argued that Knotts directly applies to GPS.396  In Maynard, the D.C. 
Circuit applied the probabilistic model,397 arguing that it is unlikely that a 
stranger would monitor the entirety of a suspect’s movements.398  Knotts 
applies the private facts model399 to electronic surveillance, which Kerr 
argued is more workable for evaluating technological surveillance.400  In 
the private facts model, the nature of the information is relevant, regardless 
of the technology used to acquire it.401 
Second, Maynard changed the Fourth Amendment inquiry from whether 
a particular act is a search to whether an entire course of conduct is a 
search, without any supporting precedent.402  This approach creates a line-
drawing problem:  neither police nor the lower courts will know when a set 
of non-searches becomes a search.403  In Kerr’s view, Maynard was 
wrongly decided, so Judge Gauvey’s reliance on it is problematic.404 
 
 390. Kerr, supra note 388. 
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c.  Payton and Steagald Allow a Search Warrant to Apprehend the Subject 
of an Arrest Warrant 
Kerr is less convinced about the application of Payton and Steagald to 
tracking, calling the question “interesting” and “difficult.”405  He considers 
it strange that an arrest warrant could allow police to break into a suspect’s 
home but not allow them to locate the suspect’s phone.406  He objects to 
Judge Gauvey’s observation that location tracking would be a novel 
extension of Payton.407  The application of Payton is only novel, Kerr 
argues, because Fourth Amendment protection of a location is a novel 
theory.408 
Kerr suggests that Steagald may be read to allow a warrant for 
tracking.409  Steagald requires that police obtain a search warrant to search 
the homes of third parties for the subject of an arrest warrant.410  In Kerr’s 
view, Steagald’s search warrant requirement is focused on the 
government’s need to justify the intrusion.411  The warrant requirement 
protects the Fourth Amendment rights of the third parties.412  The same 
logic supports a search of a phone company’s computer to determine the 
suspect’s whereabouts.413  If the government can justify this imposition to a 
magistrate, the rights of third parties are protected.414 
In short, Professor Kerr disagrees with Specified Wireless Telephone 
on both relevant questions.  Kerr argues that precise, persistent cell phone 
tracking is not a search, but that it would be reasonable if it were.415  
Because he rejects Maynard’s mosaic theory, he argues that cell phone 
tracking is not a search.416  He also argues that cell phone location is 
unprotected under Smith because it is voluntarily disclosed noncontent 
information.417  Even if precise, persistent tracking were a search, Kerr 
believes it would be reasonable under Payton if police used it to apprehend 
the subject of an arrest warrant.418  He agrees with Bermudez that tracking 
is a lesser intrusion than physical entry into the home and argues that 
Steagald provides police with the ability to acquire a search warrant to aid 
in locating and arresting the subject of an arrest warrant.419 
 
 405. See id. 
 406. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)). 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. 
 414. See id. 
 415. See supra notes 380–414 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 392–404 and accompanying text. 
 417. See supra notes 381–91 and accompanying text. 
 418. See supra notes 405–14 and accompanying text. 
 419. See supra notes 405–14 and accompanying text. 
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III.  COURTS SHOULD AUTHORIZE PRECISE, PERSISTENT TRACKING 
FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF APPREHENDING THE SUBJECT OF 
AN ARREST WARRANT 
Cell phone tracking is a search that should be permitted solely to 
facilitate the arrest.  Courts should allow tracking for the short time 
necessary to effect arrest, preventing the use of such tracking for 
investigative purposes. 
A.  Persistent Precision Tracking Is a Search 
This section argues that precise, persistent tracking is a search.  It first 
argues that cell phone tracking violates a reasonable expectation of privacy 
by revealing intimate details of the subject's movement in both private and 
public spaces.  It further argues that the third-party doctrine should not 
apply to cell phone location information. 
1.  Cell Phone Tracking Potentially Violates Privacy in 
Movement and Location 
Precise, persistent tracking can result in two distinct types of searches.  
First, tracking over extended periods can reveal intimate details about the 
subject’s life.420  Because rules must account for foreseeable technological 
advances,421 courts should treat tracking as if it provides the subject’s exact 
location, even inside private spaces.422  As Judge Gauvey observed, cell 
phone tracking implicates privacy concerns similar to the automobile 
tracking in Maynard, the D.C. Circuit ruling that preceded and survived 
Jones.423  Both Judge Gauvey and the Maynard court wrote that the 
aggregation of location information over time could reveal intimate details 
of the subject’s life,424 but because precisely tracking a cell phone also 
penetrates private spaces, the issue is distinct.425  The GPS tracking in 
Jones aggregated only movements on public roads.426  Precise, persistent 
tracking of a cell phone reveals movement in both public and private 
spaces, including a subject’s own home.427 
Kerr’s criticism that Judge Gauvey overrelies on the Maynard holding is 
misplaced.428  Maynard held that otherwise-legal police activity could 
become a search over time.429  Precise, persistent cell phone tracking is a 
collection of searches and nonsearches that become more intrusive over 
time.  Judge Gauvey could have employed the “mosaic” logic of Maynard 
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without relying on the holding.  And unlike the tracking in Jones, cell 
phone tracking is not analogous to any acceptable police activity.  GPS 
tracking resembles tailing vehicles and mass videotaping, but no preexisting 
police practice enables surveillance of all movements, public and private.430  
The Jones decision strengthened Judge Gauvey’s position, as it appears that 
the mosaic theory has traction with at least five justices.431 
More importantly, precise persistent cell phone tracking reveals private 
facts.432  The Court often uses the “private facts” model to evaluate new 
forms of electronic surveillance.433  Knotts turned primarily on this 
consideration.  Individuals should, however, have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their location and movements within private spaces.  This 
principle underlies Katz:  entering a private space creates the expectation 
that others will not intrude.434  It is no less applicable to tracking movement 
than it is to video or audio surveillance.  Combining these private facts with 
public surveillance reveals more intimate details than the surveillance in 
Jones.  Precise, persistent cell phone tracking also provides considerably 
more information:  it reveals a person’s location at all times, not just when 
he or she is driving. 
Maynard and Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence do not suggest that all 
GPS surveillance of automobiles is a search.435  Rather, GPS surveillance 
for a sustained period can become a search if done long enough to create a 
“mosaic,” revealing intimate details of the subject’s life.436  While precise, 
persistent tracking of a cell phone will likely construct a mosaic much faster 
than would GPS tracking of an automobile,437 it does not reveal intimate 
details instantaneously.  This distinction is particularly relevant when 
considering cell phone tracking to facilitate an arrest.  In many cases, the 
arrest will happen quickly enough that no intimate details are revealed.438  
In Bermudez, police made the arrest the same day they began tracking the 
subject.439  In cases like Bermudez, precise, persistent tracking is not a 
search under a mosaic analysis. 
Tracking need not construct a mosaic to be a search, however.  Tracking 
a cell phone within a home is always a search, regardless of what that 
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tracking reveals.440  The home is sacrosanct in Fourth Amendment law:  all 
details of the home are intimate details.441  Judge Gauvey’s analysis is 
correct; precise, persistent tracking is analogous to the searches in Kyllo and 
Karo.  The Bermudez court examined 2006 location technology, which 
placed the phone within a building but not a particular residence.442  The 
tracking in Bermudez resembled the group of lockers in Karo, but Karo 
explicitly declared that precision tracking within the home is a search.443  
Precise cell phone tracking, like a beeper, reveals critical facts about the 
home’s interior.444 
The Bermudez dicta observing that Karo left open whether probable 
cause should be required is somewhat misleading.  Karo held that beeper 
tracking is a search445 and refused to depart from the warrant 
requirement.446  In a footnote at the very end of the analysis, the Court 
explained that the issue of whether reasonable suspicion could justify the 
search was not before the Court and could be resolved in another case.447 
Under Kyllo and Karo, precise, persistent tracking within a home is a 
search because it reveals details of a home.448  Such searches require 
probable cause unless they fall under an existing exception to that 
requirement.449  Precise, persistent cell phone tracking thus involves two 
types of potential searches:  “mosaic” searches and Karo searches. 
2.  The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Apply to Cell Phone Location 
Under Smith and Miller, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily transmitted to third parties.450  If Smith and Miller 
apply to precise, persistent tracking, it is not a search.  In her order, Judge 
Gauvey did not address the third-party doctrine.451  She may have 
considered the issue settled by the Third Circuit in Electronic 
Communication Service.452  Bermudez, decided before the Third Circuit 
ruled, held that Smith could apply to cell phones, because the signal is 
“knowingly exposed” to third parties.453  However, Bermudez considered 
the constitutionality of an officer calling a phone to hear it ring, not the 
constitutionality of tracking.454  This action falls within Kerr’s “positive 
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law” model.455  By calling the phone, an officer does not exceed the 
abilities of a private citizen.  In turning on their phones, individuals allow 
any third party to call them.  By contrast, location tracking exceeds the 
ability of the ordinary citizen. 
No court has suggested that precise, persistent tracking should fall under 
Smith, but in his critique of Judge Gauvey’s opinion, Professor Kerr argues 
that cell phone location is unprotected.456  To track a phone in small 
intervals, police do not rely on the voluntary action of the users.  While 
Professor Kerr’s critique asserts that Smith applies to all location 
information, his substantive argument only addresses CSLI generated when 
the user makes a call.457  It would stretch Smith past plausibility to argue 
that users voluntarily disclose their location to third parties merely by 
carrying a cell phone that can be tracked with GPS. 
Kerr’s actual claim seems to be that police should have access to location 
information recorded in the ordinary course of business.458  Like the 
information in Smith and Miller, he argues, CSLI is voluntarily revealed by 
the user and is an essential part of placing a cell phone call.459  The Third 
Circuit, the only court of appeals to consider the issue, has ruled that Smith 
does not apply, because cell phone users do not know that their location is 
disclosed to the service provider.460 
But by relying on consumers’ continued ignorance, the Third Circuit has 
set a weak precedent.461  Some courts have already contradicted its 
holding.462  As Kerr observes, more users understand the rudiments of the 
technology with every passing day.463  And Congress or the Federal 
Communications Commission could easily circumvent the Third Circuit by 
mandating some form of disclosure on phone packaging or materials. 
The country would benefit from a strong Supreme Court opinion on the 
third-party doctrine.  To have such ambiguity and inconsistency in a major 
area of privacy law is a problem.  Ambiguity is particularly unfortunate in a 
doctrine declaring that individuals assume the risk that the government will 
access information they disclose to third parties.464  If the Court determines 
that technology users assume the risk of disclosure, then the Court ought to 
inform them what risks they are assuming. 
Smith and Miller should not apply to all information disclosed to third 
parties.  Each was limited to a specific kind of information.  Bank records, 
while detailed and potentially revelatory, are business documents.465  The 
 
 455. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text for a description of the positive law 
model. 
 456. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 457. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 458. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 459. See supra notes 382–84 and accompanying text. 
 460. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 461. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
 462. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
 463. See supra note 386 and accompanying text. 
 464. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 465. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
2012] TRACK ME MAYBE 531 
Fourth Amendment, which protects people in their homes and effects, 
offers greater protection to personal information than it does to business 
information.466  Location information, particularly within private spaces, is 
personal information that should be afforded more protection than business 
records. 
Smith applies to personal information, but the opinion emphasizes the 
limited capability of the pen register technology at issue.467  While a pen 
register cannot even tell if a call is completed, CSLI reveals the number 
dialed, the length of the call, and the user’s location.  Numbers dialed are 
revelatory, but not nearly as revelatory as CSLI.  Warshak supports the 
proposition that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of communications disclosed to intermediaries.468  Courts should 
go further.  Individuals should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
all but the sort of limited information considered in Smith:  phone numbers, 
email to/from addresses, and their direct factual analogues. 
In the past, the distinction between content and noncontent was helpful, 
because no court had considered a form of information that fell between the 
categories of content and limited information.469  Smith explicitly limited its 
holding to pen registers, but its argument contains expansive language that 
courts have applied to a variety of information.470 
As Justice Sotomayor argued in Jones, that approach is “ill suited to the 
digital age.”471  Smith was essentially a backward-looking decision.472  It 
gave great weight to the replacement of human operators by automatic 
switching boards.473  It certainly did not contemplate the wide swaths of 
American life that would take place in the digital sphere.  As Judge 
Kennedy wrote in Quon, much of the technology that requires third party 
disclosure could become essential self-expression and self-identity.474  Cell 
phones are the paradigmatic example.  Smith contemplated a world in which 
a human operator facilitated telephone calls and could memorize the 
numbers dialed for use in subsequent questioning.475  Cell phone users 
disclose much more detailed information.476  While a list of all numbers 
dialed is revealing, even intermittent CSLI provides a comprehensive 
picture of a user’s life. 
Judge Smith and Professor Freiwald, who write that CSLI falls outside of 
the third-party doctrine, provide the correct approach.477  Smith did not 
 
 466. See id. at 440. 
 467. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 468. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 469. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 470. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 471. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
 472. See supra Part I.B.5.b. 
 473. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
 476. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 477. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
532 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
establish an absolute binary between content and noncontent.478  It only 
acknowledges that there is some information that is unprotected if disclosed 
to a third party, and some information that remains protected.479  There is 
no reason to construe Smith more broadly in the twenty-first century than 
the twentieth.  Precise, persistent tracking reveals intimate details of a 
person’s life,480 and carrying a cell phone has, as Justice Kennedy put it, 
become essential to self-expression and even self-identity.481  Smith should 
not apply to such data. 
The third-party doctrine should not apply to cell phone location tracking 
of any kind, whether the information is voluntarily exposed or the result of 
a GPS ping.  Courts should consider the acquisition of such data a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
B.  Payton Authorizes Limited Cell Phone Tracking to Aid Apprehension 
An arrest warrant will render some searches reasonable that would 
otherwise be unreasonable.482  Payton grants police the authority to enter a 
house for the limited purpose of executing an arrest warrant.483  Bermudez 
held that this power justifies the “lesser intrusion” of cell phone tracking.484  
Judge Gauvey disagreed, calling precise, persistent tracking a “different, 
and arguably more” intrusive search.485 
Bermudez only considered the second type of search discussed in Part 
III.A.1, one that resembles the search in Karo.486  Bermudez is correct:  a 
single instance of tracking the subject into the home is less intrusive than a 
physical Payton entry.  Specified Wireless Telephone primarily considered 
the first type of search:  a mosaic of public and private movements that 
reveals intimate details of the subject’s life.487  Whether Payton justifies 
that search is a thornier question. 
Judge Gauvey wrote that Payton could not justify this sort of mosaic 
search.488  Because the government cited no authority applying Payton to 
location tracking, Judge Gauvey rejected the theory.489  However, as Kerr 
explains, the application is novel because the concept of privacy in location 
and movement is itself novel.490  Preexisting doctrines may apply to new 
legal concepts.  While the novel application of Payton to tracking should be 
scrutinized, it cannot be dismissed out of hand.  The Payton opinion 
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considered entry into a home the most intrusive of police actions.491  To the 
extent precise, persistent tracking is a lesser intrusion, it should be 
permitted.  However, this is the beginning of the argument, not the end. 
Payton justifies a significant intrusion, but it does not justify information-
gathering.492  Judge Gauvey is correct in this regard.493  Precise, persistent 
tracking may be less intrusive than a Payton search, but it can provide 
considerably more information.494  Payton provides authority to cross the 
threshold of the home but no authority to investigate beyond what is 
necessary to locate the arrestee.495  Police arresting inside the home can 
perform protective sweeps and search for accomplices to protect their own 
safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence, but such powers are not 
inherent to a Payton search.496  Each power is designed for a particular 
hazard when police are inside a home and must be justified by specific 
facts.497 
Those powers do not apply in the context of cell phone tracking, which 
presents none of the dangers of in-home arrests.  A Payton search may 
reveal information in plain view, but police cannot investigate more than 
necessary to arrest the person.  While an arrestee cannot forestall a justified 
protective sweep by cooperating with a Payton search of the home, 
cooperation could conceivably narrow the scope of the search by reducing 
the risk to officer safety or of the destruction of evidence.498  In contrast, 
the subject has no knowledge of cell phone tracking, which allows police to 
search even when the suspect wishes to cooperate.  Additionally, a Payton 
physical entry is a one-time event, which limits the information it can 
reveal.499  Police could not rearrest the suspect later to find more 
incriminating evidence.  Uncontrolled tracking, however, would tempt 
police into delaying arrest while learning the defendant’s movements. 
For precise, persistent tracking to be a reasonable search under Payton, it 
must be limited.  Tracking used exclusively to facilitate arrest is reasonable.  
Any information police uncover during such a search would be analogous 
to objects within plain view during a Payton search.500  Tracking for an 
investigative purpose, even ostensibly to execute an arrest warrant, is an 
unreasonable search, unjustified by Payton or any other doctrine.  Both 
Bermudez and Judge Gauvey’s opinion can peacefully coexist under this 
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analysis.  In Bermudez, police attempted to make the arrest within a day of 
beginning tracking.501  That search was reasonable under Payton.  Judge 
Gauvey rejected an application for thirty days of tracking.502  If given 
access to the exact location of the person to be arrested, officers should be 
able to arrest him in a matter of hours, not weeks.  Thirty days of precise, 
persistent tracking facilitates an investigation, not an arrest. 
C.  Cell Phone Tracking Must Be Tightly Controlled 
The courts’ challenge is to craft rules for tracking that facilitate arrest 
while protecting the rights of the arrestee.  Tracking to facilitate arrest will 
only be necessary when the suspect’s crime is unrelated to his location or 
movements.503  Probable cause to arrest will often provide probable cause 
to track a suspect’s movements, if movement and location will provide 
evidence of the crime.504  Because tracking to facilitate arrest will only be 
necessary when location is not evidence of the crime leading to arrest, tight 
limitations are important.  An arrest warrant should not justify a fishing 
expedition for evidence of a more serious crime. 
Tracking the subject of an arrest warrant should only be allowed pursuant 
to a court order.  While Payton allows police to enter the home of the 
subject of an arrest warrant without judicial approval,505 the unique nature 
of precise, persistent tracking justifies this imposition.  Neutral magistrates, 
not the officers themselves, are best positioned to ensure that police do not 
use tracking for investigative purposes.506  Requiring court approval is also 
necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties, whose 
homes would be searched if they contained the tracked cell phone. 
Court oversight also prevents police from having more power to track a 
suspect under an arrest warrant than under a search warrant.507  Generally, 
orders allowing tracking to facilitate arrest should only sanction tracking for 
a few days or a reasonable time.  A few days is likely ample time to effect 
most arrests.508  If police have reason to believe that an arrest will take 
longer, or if they face unforeseen difficulties, a magistrate could grant more 
time.  The paramount concern should be giving police only the time 
necessary to make the arrest. 
This approach has one further advantage.  If tracking is limited to the 
time necessary to make the arrest, it will not be a mosaic search at all.  A 
few days will seldom reveal the sort of intimate details of the subject’s life 
contemplated in Maynard.509 
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Under this approach, because Payton authorizes tracking to facilitate 
arrest, the government need not meet the standards Specified Wireless 
Telephone sets forth for acquiring a search warrant to apprehend the 
suspect.  The ability to track under an arrest warrant obviates the need for a 
separate search warrant to “look anywhere.”510  Moreover, careful judicial 
control of the tracking will mitigate potential abuse.  Police can indeed look 
anywhere by tracking, but strict time-limiting prevents the sort of general 
investigative activity that troubled Specified Wireless Telephone and the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment.511 
Requiring a court order serves a second, related purpose:  drawing a 
bright line between the pre-arrest investigation and the performance of the 
arrest itself.  An arrest warrant carries no time limit, so police can continue 
investigating the suspect long after securing an arrest warrant.512  A 
traditional Payton home arrest necessarily ends the pre-arrest investigation 
phase, because the suspect is brought into custody.  Agents making the 
arrest do not have a free hand to investigate during a Payton search, except 
under exigent circumstances.513  And cell phone tracking does not involve 
the same exigencies—danger to the officers and destruction of the 
evidence—as in-home arrests.  Precise, persistent tracking is an application 
of the Payton doctrine, and it should be subject to the same limitation.  
When police apply for a court order authorizing tracking, their pre-arrest 
investigation should be over.  As if they had entered a house that presented 
no justification for a protective sweep,514 they must try to make the arrest as 
soon as possible after beginning tracking.  If police could track while they 
investigate, they could not avoid using tracking to investigate.  The 
magistrate’s order creates the appropriate separation. 
In sum, requiring a court order and strict time-limiting ensures that 
precise, persistent tracking is used to facilitate arrest, not to further an 
investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Precise cell phone tracking is a useful tool, allowing police to make 
arrests quickly and efficiently.  Police should not be denied this ability, but 
it cannot become an investigative tool.  While precise, persistent tracking of 
a cell phone is a search, it can be reasonable if used to facilitate arrest 
pursuant to an arrest warrant.  Because Payton authorizes police entry into 
the home, it allows the lesser intrusion of cell phone tracking.  However, 
police can only enter the home to perform an arrest, and tracking should be 
subjected to the same limitations.  Judicial supervision ensures that tracking 
is used to help make the arrest, not to investigate the arrestee.  If precise, 
persistent tracking is performed under court supervision and is only used to 
facilitate arrest, it is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
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